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We propose a schematic setup of quantum key distribution (QKD) with an improved secret key
rate based on high-dimensional quantum states. Two degrees-of-freedom of a single photon, orbital
angular momentum modes, and multi-path modes, are used to encode secret key information. Its
practical implementation consists of optical elements that are within the reach of current technologies
such as a multiport interferometer. We show that the proposed feasible protocol has improved the
secret key rate with much sophistication compared to the previous 2-dimensional protocol known
as the detector-device-independent QKD.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a novel scheme to
distribute a symmetric secret key between two distant
authorized parties, Alice, and Bob, by exploiting quan-
tum mechanical phenomena. The protocol provides an
information-theoretic security under potential attacks of
malicious eavesdropper, conventionally called Eve. Since
its first seminal proposal called BB84 protocol [1], many
relevant or extended versions of QKD protocols have been
proposed and studied based on quantum principles [2–8].
In recent QKD studies, the security defects due to
device imperfections have been emerging as an impor-
tant issue. It has been shown that Eve can hack into
the QKD system by exploiting the imperfection of de-
vices. This is known as a side channel attack includ-
ing photon number splitting (PNS) attack [9], faked-
state attack [10], detector efficiency mismatch attack
[11], detector blinding attack [12, 13], time-shift attack
[14], and laser damage attack [15]. In this background,
measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) was
proposed to overcome the problems coming from imper-
fections of measurement devices [16]. In MDI-QKD, the
Bell state measurement (BSM) of two photons [17] is an
essential task. However, the success probability of BSM
with linear optics on single photons is upper bounded
by 50% [18, 19]. Recent advanced schemes of BSM re-
quire multi-photon encoding of 2-dimensional quantum
states, called qubits, to beat the limit with linear optics
[20–24]. Then, detector-device-independent QKD (DDI-
QKD) was proposed [25–27] to simplify the scheme of
MDI-QKD, exploiting two different degrees-of-freedoms
(DoFs) in a single photon and single-photon interference
instead of two-photon interference. In its protocol, Alice
encodes her information into one DoF of a single photon
and sends it to Bob, who encodes his information into an-
other DoF of the single photon. The measurement result
of the single photon reveals correlation of two DoFs in
the single photon. The implementation of DDI-QKD re-
quires only measurements on single photons and is thus
less challenging than BSM performed on two photons.
As its scheme is similar to the process of BSM used in
MDI-QKD, it was conjectured that DDI-QKD guaran-
tees the same security level with MDI-QKD. However, it
has been shown that not all the side channel attacks are
protected with DDI-QKD [28, 29], and an assumption of
the trusted measurement setup is necessary for ensuring
its security.
In another branch of QKD researches, there have been
significant effort to improve secret key rate, for exam-
ple, using d-dimensional quantum states, called qudits.
There are several advantages of using qudits a general-
ized information carrier. For example, qudits (d > 2) can
naturally carry more classical information than qubits.
Compared to qubit operations, qudits has been shown
to be more robust against quantum cloning (i.e. a possi-
ble eavesdropping) [30–32]. It has been also found that
the efficiency of key distribution increases with qudits
in an ideal situation [32–36]. Various high-dimensional
QKD protocols have been proposed such as a generalized
version of BB84, a multipartite high-dimensional QKD
[37], and MDI-QKDs using high-dimensional quantum
states [38–40]. Moreover, QKD protocols using qudits
have been implemented experimentally in various quan-
tum system, for instance, energy-time eigenstates [41–45]
and orbital angular momentum (OAM) mode of a single
photon [46–50].
In this article, we propose a schematic configuration of
high-dimensional QKD based on hybrid encoding over
two different DoFs. We demonstrate that the secret
key rate is improved with our scheme over previous 2-
dimensional QKD based on two different DoFs of a single
photon. We also present its implementation with current
optical technologies, by exploiting the OAM mode of a
single photon as a high-dimensional information carrier.
We evaluate the secret key rate of our scheme with re-
spect to the experimental parameters and identify the
regime where our scheme is more secure than the origi-
nal DDI-QKD. In addition, we also compare the security
of our scheme with that of high-dimensional MDI-QKD
(for the case of d = 3).
We note that our protocol is more secure than the orig-
inal BB84 protocol against a side channel attack (but less
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2FIG. 1. A schematic setup of 3-dimensional QKD with hybrid encoding. Alice uses OAM modes of a single photon, and
Bob controls phase of each path to encode their information in the single photon. The encoded photon enters into 3-port
interferometer. After single photon interference, a OAM value and existing path of the single photon is measured. SLM :
spatial light modulator; BS1 : 50:50 beam splitter; BS2 : beam splitter of which transmissivity is 1/3; BS3 : beam splitter of
which transmissivity is 2/3; OAM CT : cyclic transformation of OAM modes.
secure than MDI-QKD). For example, it can detect the
basic detector blinding attack [12] from double clicks of
detectors [28, 29]. On the other hand, the attained key
rate with our protocol is comparable with BB84 proto-
col, while MDI-QKD has a half of signal sifting rate of
BB84 protocol due to the 50% limit of the success prob-
ability of the BSM. Although DDI-QKD is not as se-
cure as MDI-QKD and requires trusted elements in BSM
setup, the main idea of employing two different DoFs mo-
tivated by DDI-QKD still merits consideration for prac-
tical usage in some secure communications e.g. quantum
secret sharing [51]. As we demonstrate in this article,
it is possible to improve the security as well as the ef-
ficiency over the original DDI-QKD in high-dimensional
approach. In addition, we here propose a feasible high-
dimensional QKD scheme with OAM of a single photon,
while a high-dimensional MDI-QKD may be hard to real-
ize due to the difficulty in implementing high-dimensional
BSM on two photons with linear optical elements [19].
This article is organized as follows. A schematic de-
scription of the d-dimensional QKD (d-QKD) with hy-
brid encoding is presented in Sec. II, and its practical
implementation is in Sec. III. In Sec. IV, we analyze the
secure key rate of our protocol. Finally, conclusion on
the efficiencies is drawn in Sec. V.
II. SCHEMATIC DESCRIPTION
In this section, we describe a schematic setup of d-QKD
with hybrid encoding. As an example, the schematic
setup of 3-dimensional QKD (3d-QKD) with hybrid en-
coding is shown in Fig. 1. In d-QKD with hybrid en-
coding, we exploit OAM mode and multipath mode of
a single photon as a information carrier, since the OAM
mode is known to be suitable for quantum communica-
tion as it is resilient against perturbation effects [52].
As a first step of the protocol, Alice generates d-
dimensional information randomly. Subsequently, Alice
randomly chooses a encoding basis between two mutually
unbiased bases (MUBs) which are written as {|lx〉} and
{|l¯x〉} where x ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., d− 1}. The relation between
the two MUBs is described as the d-dimensional discrete
Fourier transformation on the d OAM modes which is
shown in Eq. (1):
|l¯x〉 = 1
d
d−1∑
k=0
ωxk |lk〉 (1)
where ω = exp (2pii/d). Alice encodes her d-dimensional
information in OAM modes of a single photon [53]. For
example, when d = 3, Alice’s classical information x3
would be one of the dimensional integers, x3 ∈ {0, 1, 2},
and she generates a quantum state denoted as |lx3〉 whose
OAM value is (x3 − 1).
Subsequently, Alice sends the encoded photon to Bob,
who encodes his d-dimensional information in multi-
path modes of the single photon. Bob also uses two
MUBs that are described as {|py〉} and {|p¯y〉}. |py〉 de-
notes a single photon state in the optical path py where
y ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., d − 1}. Similarly with Alice’s bases,
the relation between Bob’s two bases is given as the d-
dimensional discrete Fourier transformation of the d path
modes. Fig. 2 shows a schematic setup of Bob’s encod-
ing systems. Bob randomly chooses one basis between
path modes and bar path modes, which are MUB of the
path modes. If Bob uses a path mode, he selects one
optical path among {p0, p1, p2} corresponding to his in-
formation. If he chooses a bar path mode, he encodes his
information by selecting a phases set {B1, B2} in Fig. 2
3(a) Path mode encoding
(b) Bar path mode encoding
FIG. 2. Schematic setups of Bob’s two encoding systems.
(a) Bob chooses one path to encode his information by using
optical switch. (b) Bob encodes his information by control
phase shifters, B1 and B2. Details are described in the main-
text. BS1 : 50:50 beam splitter; BS2 : beam splitter of which
transmissivity is 1/3; PS : phase shifter
(b) among {1, 1}, {ω, ω2}, and {ω2, ω}.
After Bob’s encoding, the two qudits encoded in the
single photon, which can be written as |lx, py〉, goes to
a cyclic transformation of OAM modes. A transformed
OAM value of the single photon in path py is obtained
with the following rule: x → x + d − y (mod d). Sub-
sequently, a single photon interference is performed by
recombining d-path via beam splitters that have differ-
ent transmissivity. The unitary transformation on path
modes operated by multi-port interferometer, called trit-
ter [54], is defined as the d-dimensional discrete Fourier
transformation on the d path modes as shown in Eq. (2):
Uˆd =
1√
d

1 1 1 1 · · · 1
1 ω ω2 ω3 · · · ωd−1
1 ω2 ω4 ω6 · · · ω2(d−1)
1 ω3 ω6 ω9 · · · ω3(d−1)
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 ωd−1 ω2(d−1) ω3(d−1) · · · ω(d−1)(d−1)

.
(2)
Subsequently, a OAM value of the single photon is
measured in each output port of the tritter. The re-
sult of the measurement is obtained from click of a single
photon detector. A click in one of the d2 detectors cor-
responds to a projection into one of the following two
qudits encoded in a single photon written in Eq. (3):
|Φdi+j〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
x=0
ωjx |lx, px+i〉 , (3)
where i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., d − 1}, and (mod d) is omitted
in the subscript of p. Since the states have the similar
form to the d-dimensional Bell states, it is expected that
the states can be used to distribute a secret key between
Alice and Bob. The relation between two qudits encoded
in a single photon that enters into the tritter and its
corresponding detector click event is shown in Eq. (4):
|Φdi+j〉 → D(ld−i, pd−j) (4)
where i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., d− 1}, and we label a click event
of a single photon detector as D(lx, py) corresponding
to the single photon whose OAM value is lx and path
mode is py after the tritter operation. Since there are
d2 orthonormal states in Eq. (3), the measurement setup
should include d2 single photon detectors for one-to-one
correspondence of the states and the detectors.
TABLE I. An example of Bob’s operation on his encoded
information when d = 3 and the result of the measurement
is |Φ3i+j〉. According to their bases choice and the measure-
ment result, it is necessary to retrieve his information for
sharing the same information.
Bases Bob’s operation (|Φ3i+j〉)
bases 1 (lx, py) y → y − i (mod 3)
1↔ 2 for j = 0
bases 2 (l¯x, p¯y) 0↔ 2 for j = 1
0↔ 1 for j = 2
In order to share a secret key, it is necessary to retrieve
Bob’s information based on the basis choice of Alice and
Bob, and the result of the measurement. For restoration,
Alice sends her basis choice to Bob. The method of the
restoration is shown in Table I as an example when 3d-
QKD with hybrid encoding is performed. Bob announces
only the basis matching information through classical
communication, not the result of the measurement. Alice
does not need to know the measurement outcome, since
Bob already retrieved his encoded information by using
the result.
III. EXPERIMENTAL IMPLEMENTATION
We investigate a practical implementation of experi-
mental elements that can construct d-QKD with hybrid
encoding. Alice can generate a single photon OAM state
by means of a spatial light modulator (SLM) [55]. SLMs
usually have a limited frame rate of around 60 Hz, for fast
generation of various OAM values, a digital micromir-
ror device(DMD) is more desirable [56]. An OAM sorter
based on liquid crystal devices can also generate photonic
OAM states. [57, 58].
Bob’s path encoding system is realizable with an op-
tical switch over d-port, and a schematic setup is shown
in Fig. 2 (a). Bob’s bar path encoding system can be
changed from Fig. 2 (b) by using an optical d-port switch
and a d-port tritter, whose operation on path modes
4FIG. 3. A schematic diagram of experimental setup of three-fold cyclic transformation of OAM modes. There are OAM beam
splitters (OAM BSs) which consist of a Mach-Zehnder interferometer with Dove prisms. α/2 means relative angle between the
two Dove prisms. The first OAM BS (α = pi) and the final OAM BS (α = −pi) change a direction of propagation of a photon
whose OAM value is odd and even, respectively. The second OAM BS (α = pi/2) separates a photon whose OAM value is 0
and 2. With OAM holograms, the three-fold cyclic transformation of OAM modes {−1, 0, 1} is accomplished.
is the d-dimensional discrete Fourier transformation as
shown in Eq. (2). With the tritter, Bob can choose bar
path mode by selecting an input port of the tritter rather
than controlling the phase shifters in Fig. 2 (b).
After Bob’s encoding, cyclic transformations of OAM
modes are performed in the each port. Fig. 3 shows a
schematic setup of three-fold OAM cyclic transforma-
tion (+1) of OAM values {−1, 0, 1}. The setup consists
of OAM holograms, mirrors, beam splitters and OAM
beam splitters (OAM BSs). An OAM BS, composed of a
Mach-Zehnder interferometer with a Dove prism in each
arm, sorts individual photons based on their OAM value
[59]. α is defined from relative angle α/2 between the two
Dove prisms and relative phase between photons in the
two arms is given by exp(ilα). The three-fold OAM cyclic
transformation (+1) consists of three OAM BSs whose α
are pi, pi/2, and −pi. The first OAM BS (α = pi) and the
final OAM BS (α = −pi) change the direction of propa-
gation of a photon whose OAM value is odd and even,
respectively. The second OAM BS (α = pi/2) spatially
separates photons whose OAM value is 0 and 2. Pho-
tons are separated and combined spatially by using the
OAM BSs according to their OAM value. With OAM
holograms on each arms, the three-fold cyclic transfor-
mation of OAM modes {−1, 0, 1} is accomplished as it is
shown in Fig. 3. The experimental setup of the four-fold
and five-fold cyclic transformation of OAM modes were
proposed and demonstrated as well [60–63]. While the-
oretical efficiency of the four-fold cyclic transformation
is 100%, fidelity of 4-dimensional Bell state transforma-
tion using the four-fold cyclic transformation setup was
reported as roughly 91.5% due to reflectivity of optical
elements and misalignment [61].
Subsequently, d-port single photon interference is per-
formed by using the tritter shown in Eq. (2). The trit-
ter can be implemented with only linear optical elements
which are beam splitters, mirrors, and phase shifters. Af-
ter the interference, an OAM value of the single photon
is measured. Direct measurements of an OAM value of
a single photon have been studied recently, for instance,
by using refractive optical elements that convert OAM
modes into transverse momentum modes [64, 65], re-
fractive optical elements that give spatial separation of
OAM modes [66], sequential weak and strong measure-
ments [67, 68], spectrum analysis based on the rotational
Doppler effect [69], and interferogram analysis with a
multipixel camera [70].
There has been an experimental demonstration of the
prepare-and-measure qudit QKD using seven OAM val-
ues of a single photon, which includes DMD for fast gen-
eration of single photon OAM states and spatial separa-
tion of OAM modes proposed in for OAM mode detection
[56, 66]. In the experiment, it was reported that the effi-
ciency of OAM mode separation was 93%. It is expected
that an experimental demonstration of d-QKD with hy-
brid encoding is possible by using above technologies as
well as the prepare-and-measure qudit QKD.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Before we analyze security of d-QKD with hybrid en-
coding, we need to assume constraints to construct secure
d-QKD with hybrid encoding as it is studied in [28]: (i)
Alice’s and Bob’s random number generators and their
classical post-processing should be trusted. (ii) Alice’s
and Bob’s encoding systems should be fully characterized
and not be influenced by Eve. (iii) Eve cannot physically
access to the output ports of the interferometer, in our
protocol, the tritter. (iv) The detectors may have some
imperfections, but the defects is not from Eve. The first
assumption is essential for all QKD schemes to ensure
security. The first and second assumptions are necessary
for MDI-QKD as well. The third and final assumptions
are different from the scenario of MDI-QKD. They are
necessary to prevent particular classes of side channel
attacks [28, 29]. The third assumption can be consid-
ered not impractical, since d-QKD with hybrid encoding
has the similar experimental situation to prepare-and-
measure QKD protocols like original BB84. In the situ-
ation, Bob can have full measurement setup in his room
and he can block access from the outside.
5Let us consider several side channel attacks against
d-QKD with hybrid encoding. Since its similarity of
principles to the original DDI-QKD, the security of d-
QKD with hybrid encoding against side channel attacks
is comparable to that of the original DDI-QKD studied
in [28, 29]. Faked-state attack [10], detector efficiency
mismatch attack [11], and time-shift attack [14] are not
compatible with assumption (iv) since the attacks re-
quire a prior knowledge of imperfections of the single
photon detectors. Trojan-horse attack based on back re-
flection [71–73] is considerable. In Trojan-horse attack
based on back reflection, Eve sends multi-photon states
into Alice’s(Bob’s) encoding system. The photons are re-
flected at the elements in the encoding system. Then Eve
can obtain information about a generated single photon
state by analyzing the reflected beam. The attack can be
prevented by using frequency filters and isolators like in
MDI-QKD case. Trojan-horse attack proposed in [74] is
forbidden by assumption (iv), since the detectors in the
measurement setup should be manufactured by Eve to
accomplish this attack.
Detector blinding attack can threaten QKD systems
as well. An essential procedure of the detector blinding
attack is that Eve shines strong classical light onto detec-
tors, avalanche photodiodes, to change their mode from
Geiger mode to linear mode [12]. In the linear mode,
a detection signal can be generated by the strong light
pulse that exceeds a threshold. This means that Eve can
control a detector click by regulating amplitude of the
light pulse. If a threshold of the all detectors is identi-
cal, the basic detector blinding attack can be detected
by Bob. Let us define the threshold µ. Then the ampli-
tude of Eve’s light pulse should be larger than µ when it
arrives at detectors. Eve intercepts Alice’s signal and re-
sends a strong light corresponding to the measured quan-
tum state. When Eve’s and Bob’s bases are matched, for
example OAM modes and path modes, the amplitude
of Eve’s light pulse should be larger than dµ to make a
detector click since the tritter splits the light pulse into
four output ports identically. In the situation, Bob can
notice the detector blinding attack since d detectors are
clicked simultaneously. Bob can make an error rate be af-
fected by the attack by assigning random number when
more than two detectors are clicked. If there are dif-
ferences among the threshold of detectors, it is possible
that Eve generates one detector click. The clicked detec-
tor must have the lowest threshold among the detectors.
This means that Eve cannot generate a click of the other
detectors independently. So the attack can be found by
analyzing statistics of detector clicks.
Detector blinding attack with various blinding power
[13] can threaten d-QKD with hybrid encoding as well as
the original DDI-QKD [29]. However, since the attack
requires a prior knowledge about the detectors, it is not
compatible with assumption (iv). So we can conclude
that without the assumptions which are not necessary in
MDI-QKD, the security of d-QKD with hybrid encoding
cannot be guaranteed against all detector side channel
attacks.
To detect Eve’s side channel attacks, we introduce a
random tritter operation of Bob. The tritter operation
written in Eq. (2) is performed on path modes after Bob’s
encoding. It is possible that Bob chooses one of tritter
operation among d different operations ratter than a fixed
operation. For example, Bob can chooses one operation
among the operations shown in Eq. (5):
Uˆ3,0 =
1√
3
1 1 11 ω ω2
1 ω2 ω
 , (5)
Uˆ3,1 =
1√
3
ω2 1 ω1 1 1
ω 1 ω2
 ,
Uˆ3,2 =
1√
3
ω2 ω 1ω ω2 1
1 1 1

for 3d-QKD with hybrid encoding. The operations can
be implemented by using 3d-tritter and phase shifters.
Let us consider the case that Bob chooses path mode
|p¯0〉 and Eve tries detector blinding attack with strong
pulse whose OAM mode is |l¯0〉. If Bob chooses t, where
t ∈ {0, 1, 2}, and performs the tritter operation Uˆ3,t, the
pulse goes to output port pt of the tritter. For a success-
ful attack, Eve must find pulse intensity that one detector
in the output port is clicked and the other detectors are
not, regardless of Bob’s choice of tritter operation. Also,
Eve should perform detector blinding attack with various
blinding power and find at least three different blinding
powers, since Bob monitors statistics of outcomes. For
instance, Bob can check whether |l¯0, p¯0〉 is projected onto
|Φ0〉, |Φ3〉, and |Φ6〉 equally or not. Therefore, Eve should
prepare at least three different pulse intensities, which oc-
cur click events of different detectors on the same output
port, to pass Bob’s statistics check.
For a large dimension, we expect that such attack is
improbable with the assumption (iv), i.e. with trusted
devices. Since click thresholds of different detectors are
very similar but randomly fluctuated, it is difficult to
find blinding powers and pulse intensities that satisfy the
successful attack conditions. For a successful attack, Eve
should find the powers and intensities that only one de-
tector is clicked while the other d−1 detectors in the port
are not clicked, and the attack does not influence Bob’s
outcome statistics regardless of Bob’s choice of tritter op-
eration Uˆd,t, where t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., d − 1}. Therefore, we
expect that side channel attacks are probably detected
for a high-dimensional QKD using hybrid encoding, if
Bob applies the random choice of tritter operation and
a countermeasure of a side channel attack, such as the
random-detector-efficiency protocol [75, 76]. Compared
to this, prepare-and-measure QKD protocols using high-
dimensional systems are threaten by the first proposal of
detector blinding attack [12], and the original DDI-QKD
was breached by the combined attack of the detector
6blinding attack with various blinding power and detec-
tor efficiency mismatched attack even with the random-
detector-efficiency protocol [13]. Therefore, we can con-
clude that the complexity of a successful side channel
attack becomes higher by exploiting the proposed proto-
col compared to prepare-and-measure d-QKDs and the
original DDI-QKD, although the proposed protocol does
not provide the detector-device-independent security.
It is necessary to analyze security of d-QKD with hy-
brid encoding to evaluate the usefulness of the protocol.
The analysis of the security is able to be made through
the inspection of the equivalent protocol using the entan-
glement distillation process (EDP) [4–6]. The idea of the
method is that, if Alice and Bob share the maximally en-
tangled state, Eve cannot generate correlation between
her state and the shared maximally entangled state of
Alice and Bob [77]. In the method, we can analyze the
security of the proposed protocol with the amount of dis-
tributed maximally entangled states. In order to use the
method, an equivalent protocol of which Alice and Bob
share an entangled state at the end should be introduced.
Note that the equivalent protocol is employed only for
the security analysis, so its experimental efficiency is not
significant. However, it is important that the equiva-
lent protocol is physically realizable, since any security
analysis of QKD should be valid under the quantum me-
chanics. Therefore, we will briefly introduce possible im-
plementations of the equivalent protocol to show that it
is physically reasonable.
At first, Alice and Bob generate the three-photon en-
tangled state shown in Eq. (6):
|Ψ〉ABD =
1
d
d−1∑
m,n=0
|lm〉A |l = 0, pn〉B |lm, pn〉D , (6)
where the subscript A(B) means Alice’s(Bob’s) sin-
gle photon state and the subscript D means a sin-
gle photon that goes to tritter and OAM measurement
setup. Generation of this state is possible, in princi-
ple, by using two cascade spontaneous parametric down-
conversion(SPDC) crystals, spatial discrimination ele-
ments of the OAM mode, and relabelling of the OAM and
path values. For 4-dimensional system, it was demon-
strated that generation of 4-dimensional OAM mode en-
tangled states [78] and 4-dimensional path mode entan-
gled states [79, 80] by using SPDC crystals. Alice and
Bob keep their photons, and Bob measures the photon
D by using the measurement setup. Based on the result,
Bob performs corresponding unitary operation to share
the maximally entangled state shown in Eq. (7) :
1√
d
d−1∑
k=0
|lk〉A ⊗ |pk〉B . (7)
Alice(Bob) chooses her(his) measurement basis randomly
between OAM(path) modes and bar OAM(path) modes.
After the measurement, Alice and Bob share their mea-
surement bases and discard if the two bases are not
matched. If the two bases are matched, their measure-
ment outcomes are always identical if there is no error
and no Eve.
Since the maximally entangled state is distributed to
Alice and Bob, security of the protocol becomes the same
with that of a d-dimensional entanglement based QKD.
Security of a QKD using d-dimensional maximally en-
tangled states was studied against individual attacks [33]
(Eve monitors state separately), and against collective
attacks [34, 35] (Eve monitors several states jointly). Ac-
cording to the results, secret key rate of QKD using d-
dimensional quantum states against collective attack is
evaluated as shown in Eq. (8):
r = log2 d+ 2Q log2
(
Q
d− 1
)
+ (1−Q) log2 (1−Q) .
(8)
The unit of the secret key rate is (bits/sifted signal). Q
is state error rate obtained from Eq. (9):
Q =
∑
i 6=j
〈li, pj | ρ |li, pj〉 , (9)
where ρ is density matrix of the state shared by Alice
and Bob, and i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., d − 1}. In the ideal case,
no error and no Eve, since the distributed state is the
state described in Eq. (7), the error rate becomes trivial,
Q = 0.
Now, we investigate an improvement of a secret key
rate of d-QKD with hybrid encoding compared with the
original DDI-QKD. Secret key rates per sifted signal, r, of
d-QKD with hybrid encoding are plotted in Fig. 4. Fig. 4
(a) shows the secret key rate of the original DDI-QKD
(black dotted line), 3d- (red dashed line), 4d- (blue dot-
dashed line), and 5d-QKD with hybrid encoding (orange
solid line) in the ideal situation. QKD with hybrid encod-
ing using higher dimensional quantum states has a higher
secret key rate than the original DDI-QKD at same error
rate, since a quantum system in high-dimension can carry
more information per single quanta and qudit has en-
hanced robustness against an optimal cloning and eaves-
dropping.
In Fig. 4 (b), we simulate secret key rates of d-QKD
with hybrid encoding and the original DDI-QKD with a
change of the realistic experimental factors, transmission
loss η and dark count rate of single photon detectors.
When a photon propagates through an optical fiber or
atmosphere, there is transmission loss. So transmission
efficiency is approximately proportional to the distance
between Alice and Bob that QKD is able to be achieved.
For a single photon detector, since it is very sensitive in
order to detect a very weak pulse, a single photon, it is
possible to be clicked by background noise even if there
is no received photon. The event is called dark count.
If there is no Eve, the probability of the detector click
corresponding to the state |Φ0〉 when Alice encodes x and
Bob encodes y in a single photon is able to be described
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FIG. 4. The secret key rate of the original DDI-QKD (black
dotted line), 3d- (red dashed line), 4d- (blue dot-dashed line),
and 5d-QKD with hybrid encoding (orange solid line). (a)
Plot of the secret key rate r (bits/sifted pulse) vs. state error
rate Q. (b) Plot of the secret key rate r (bits/sifted pulse)
vs. transmission loss η (dB). Dark count rate of single photon
detectors is assumed as 10−5 per pulse.
as follows:
p(x, x) =
1
d
(1− η)(1− ν)(d2−1) + ην(1− ν)(d2−1) (10)
p(x, y) = ην(1− ν)(d2−1) (11)
where x, y ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., d− 1}, x 6= y, d is the dimension
of quantum states used in d-QKD with hybrid encoding,
and ν is the dark count rate per pulse. The first term in
Eq. (10) denotes the case when the single photon arrives
at a detector and it triggers off the detector, while there
is no dark count in the other detectors. The second term
in Eq. (10) denotes the single photon detector is clicked
due to the dark count when the single photon is lost in
channel and the other detectors are not clicked. In the
ideal case, no Eve and no state error, p(x, y) should be
zero since the state cannot be projected on |Φ0〉. The
only case that the detector is clicked is that the single
photon is lost and the detector is clicked due to the dark
count. The error rate in this situation is evaluated from
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FIG. 5. The secret key rate of 3d-MDI-QKD (red dashed line)
and 3d-QKD with hybrid encoding (black solid line). Plot of
the secret key rate R (bits/total pulse) vs. transmission loss
η (dB). The secret key rate per total signal is obtained from
(the secret key rate per sifted key)×(the signal sifting rate).
Details are described in maintext. Dark count rate of single
photon detectors is assumed as 10−5 per pulse.
the equation described as follows:
Q =
∑
i 6=j p(i, j)∑d−1
x,y=0 p(x, y)
, (12)
where i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., d − 1}. The dark count rate, ν,
is assumed as 10−5 per pulse in Fig. 4 (b). In the plot,
it is shown that a secret key rate becomes higher, as the
dimension of quantum states used in d-QKD with hybrid
encoding increases in low transmission loss regime. When
the transmission loss is high, the secret key rate decreases
more rapidly as d increases. QKD with hybrid encoding
using higher dimensional quantum states is more influ-
enced by the dark count of detectors, since the number
of the single photon detector used in d-QKD with hy-
brid encoding is lager than the original DDI-QKD. There-
fore, when a single photon is lost, the error rate of QKD
with hybrid encoding using higher dimensional quantum
states increases rapidly compared with that of the origi-
nal DDI-QKD.
Now, we compare 3d-QKD with hybrid encoding with
MDI-QKD using 3-dimensional quantum states (3d-
MDI-QKD). 3d-MDI-QKD was proposed to increase a
secret key rate of original MDI-QKD [38]. In its key rate
analysis, it is assumed that 3-dimensional BSM used in
3d-MDI-QKD includes six single photon detectors and
the 3-dimensional BSM setup can discriminate only three
3-dimensional Bell states among nine ones. Fig. 5 shows
the secret key rate of 3d-MDI-QKD (red dashed line)
and 3d-QKD with hybrid encoding (black solid line). Se-
cret key rate per total pulse can be obtained from (sig-
nal sifting rate)×(secret key rate per sifted key r). The
signal sifting rate is obtained from (probability that Al-
ice and Bob used the same bases) in d-QKD with hy-
brid encoding, and (probability that Alice and Bob used
the same bases)×(success probability of a BSM) in MDI-
QKD. Since a success probability of BSM with linear
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FIG. 6. The secret key rate of 3d-QKD hybrid encoding (black
solid line) and a prepare-and-measure 3d-QKD (red dashed
line). Dark count rate of single photon detectors is assumed
as 10−5 per pulse.
optics cannot be 100% [18, 19], MDI-QKD always has a
lower secret key rate per total signal than prepare-and-
measure QKD protocols and QKD with hybrid encoding.
Furthermore, it was proven that a generalized BSM
in high-dimensional two-photon state cannot be imple-
mented by means of linear optical elements [19]. The
scheme using multi-photon interference with linear op-
tics can be adopted to implement MDI-QKD using qu-
dits [81], however, the secret key rate R of the protocol
is always lower than original MDI-QKD, since the signal
sifting rate of the protocol is given as 1/(2d2). There
is another scheme of which ideal signal sifting rate can
reach 1/(2d) by exploiting nonlinear effects, however, be-
cause of the nonlinearity, experimental efficiency of the
scheme is much lower than that of the setup with linear
optical elements [82]. Also, it was shown that a secret
key rate of MDI-QKD using qudits (d > 4) cannot ex-
ceed that of qubit MDI-QKD at low error rate even if a
signal sifting rate of a d-dimensional BSM setup reaches
1/(2d) [82]. Therefore, it can be claimed that QKD with
hybrid encoding is more suitable to exploit qudits than
MDI-QKD in its implementation, although it needs ad-
ditional assumptions to guarantee the security level of
MDI-QKD.
Here, we compare key generation efficiency of d-QKD
with hybrid encoding with that of existing d-QKDs.
First, compared with entanglement-based d-QKDs [43–
45], our protocol has advantage that generation of an
entangled state is not necessary. A high-dimensional
time-energy entangled state is generated from sponta-
neous parametric down-conversion (SPDC), and entan-
gled state generation efficiency of SPDC is not compara-
ble with a single photon OAM mode encoder.
Key generation efficiency of prepare-and-measure d-
QKDs [47–50, 83] are comparable with that of our pro-
tocol. Our protocol is vulnerable to photon loss noise
compared with prepare-and-measure d-QKDs, as it is
shown in Fig. 6. Our protocol employs d2 detectors in the
measurement setup, while prepare-and-measure d-QKDs
have 2d detectors. Because of this reason, an effect of
a dark count of detectors in our protocol is larger than
that in prepare-and-measure d-QKDs. This means that
growth in an error rate of our protocol is higher than that
of prepare-and-measure d-QKDs when a single photon is
lost. However, as it is shown in the security analysis, our
protocol can prevent certain kinds of side channel attacks
against detectors, while security of prepare-and-measure
d-QKDs is threatened even by the first proposal of de-
tector blinding attack. In consideration of this, the gap
between the two secret key rates shown in Fig. 6 is not
significant.
Finally, we note that it is possible to employ state-
of-the-art techniques in our protocol, since our protocol
is constructed with general experimental elements. For
example, in d-QKD using partial MUB of OAM [49], they
proposed using special single photon OAM modes in their
protocol for noise robustness. It is expected that the
setups used in the protocol are exploited in our protocol
for the same purpose as well.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a schematic configuration of
d-dimensional QKD based on hybrid encoding over two
different DoFs. Qudits are exploited in the setup to im-
prove a secret key rate, since a qudit can carry more clas-
sical information and it has enhanced robustness against
eavesdropping compared with a qubit. We investigated
possible practical implementations of the proposed QKD
protocol with current optical technologies. OAM modes
of a single photon is exploited as high-dimensional in-
formation carrier. OAM modes are suitable for quantum
communication because of their resilience against pertur-
bation effects. We showed that a cyclic transformation
of OAM modes can be implemented within the reach of
current technologies as well. We analyzed security of the
proposed protocol and showed there is improvement com-
pared with original qubit protocol in ideal situation. We
found the condition that d-QKD with hybrid encoding
has a higher secret key rate than the original DDI-QKD
in the consideration of realistic experimental parameters
as well. Finally we compared our protocol with exist-
ing d-QKDs and showed our protocol has advantages on
prevention of side channel attacks against detectors and
experimental feasibility.
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